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ABSTRACT 
 
As part of a broader assessment of how well the Government of Alberta’s 
labour programming contributes to fair and, to a lesser degree, safe workplaces, 
this study examines how effectively the government enforces the Employment 
Standards Code provisions regulating child and adolescent employment. 
Enforcement strategies appear to emphasize softer forms of regulation and 
thereby create little disincentive for violations. Preliminary research into the 
employment levels of children (age 9-11) suggests over 11,000 children are 
employed, some perhaps illegally, and that further inquiry into their 
employment experiences is warranted. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Canadian province of Alberta has tasked its civil service with 
ensuring its programs contribute to fair, safe and healthy workplaces. Previous 
research (Barnetson, 2008) suggests the way the government measures its 
achievement of these goals is problematic. More specifically, these measures do 
not provide a meaningful assessment of Alberta’s Employment Standards 
system. This preliminary study examines how Alberta enforces the laws 
regulating child (9-11 years old) and adolescent (12-14 years old) employment. 
These groups were chosen because they are subject to restrictive regulations and 
thought particularly vulnerable to violations of those regulations. The 
vulnerability of children and adolescents make this study valuable in itself and 
also provide insight into the overall effectiveness of Employment Standards 
enforcement. 
This study takes no position on the appropriateness of the substantive 
rights and restrictions contained in the Act (e.g., should 12-year-old be allowed 
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to perform the same jobs as 14-year-olds? is a blanket prohibition on 
employment under 12 appropriate?). This study also does not evaluate whether 
the substantive rights, if perfectly enforced, would result in the public policy 
objectives that presumably underlie them. Instead, this study examines process 
and (where visible) outcomes of Alberta’s enforcement practices. Further 
research is presently underway to provide a more fulsome examination of the 
employment experiences of minors and this is discussed at the end of the article. 
 
REGULATION OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT EMPLOYMENT 
 
Historically, Canadian children and adolescents have worked and, in 
doing so, helped to support their families and developed their own vocational 
skills (Parr, 1980; Sutherland, 1990; Bullen, 1986; Cunningham, 2000). The work 
of children around the home (e.g., chores, attending to siblings) is typically 
differentiated from work undertaken for remuneration or on goods destined for 
the market (Ashagrie, 1993; Basu, 1999).  
The regulation of child and adolescent employment by Canadian 
governments began with mining laws during the late 19th century. These were 
followed by the development of factory acts that set minimum age limits, 
restricted hours of work, and prohibited work where there was a significant 
source of danger, although the enforcement of these acts was uneven. Child 
protection, temperance, municipal, and shop legislation also regulated child and 
adolescent employment (Lorentsen and Woolner, 1950; Tucker, 1990; Finkel, 
2006).  
The employment of minors is currently regulated at the international 
level. Convention 138 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) seeks to 
abolish the employment of those under age 15 and excludes those under age 18 
from hazardous work. Exceptions in developed countries are for light work (with 
few negative physical, social or educational consequences) or for work connected 
to vocational training (Swepston, 1982). Canada is not a signatory to Convention 
138 but all provinces have legislation (e.g., employment standards, occupational 
health and safety, school attendance) regulating child and adolescent 
employment (HRSDC, 2006; England, 2000).  
When considering employment laws, it is useful to think about them as policy 
instruments—tools that propel organizations and/or individuals to act when 
otherwise they could not or would not. Policy instruments can be divided into 
four categories: 
 
1. Authority-based instruments grant permission, prohibit or require actions 
and may include changing the distribution of authority and power in the 
system. 
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2. Incentive-based instruments use inducements, sanctions, charges or force 
to encourage actions. 
3. Capacity-building instruments invest in intellectual, material or human 
resources to enable activity. 
4. Hortatory instruments signal priorities and propel actions by appealing to 
values via symbols (McDonnell, 1994; Pal, 1992; Schneider and Ingram, 
1990; McDonnell and Elmore, 1987). 
 
Legislation is normally an authority-based instrument, which authorizes 
the use incentive-based mechanics to enforce it. Governments departments may 
also engage in hortatory and capacity-building activities. Although less visible 
than legislation, the enforcement mechanisms of the law are an important 
determinant of how well legislation achieves it objectives (Tucker, 1990). 
While economic analyses of employment standards may assume 
universal compliance with employment standards, research suggests that 
compliance is less than complete (Adams, 1987). For example, Ontario’s 
Provincial Auditor (2004) notes that between 40% and 90% of proactive 
inspections (varying by sector) found violations of minimum standards. Similar 
rates of non-compliance were found federally, with 25% of federal employers not 
in compliance with most obligations under Part III of the federal law and 75% 
not in compliance with at least one provision (Arthurs, 2006). When enforcement 
is complaint-based (and that is most often the case), a significant issue is the 
willingness of employees to complain about violations unless they have left their 
employment, for fear of reprisal. 
There is general agreement that government must regulate child and 
adolescent employment, although conflict can arise over the substantive and 
procedural standards (cf. CFIB, 2006; CFRA, 2007). The rationale for regulation is 
threefold: 
 
1. Physical Safety: Legislation typically limits the range of occupations 
children and adolescents may engage in and the duties they may perform 
in order to protect the health and safety of minors. These restrictions also 
address the safety of other workers who might be affected by a workplace 
accident caused by a child or adolescent.  
2. Intellectual Development: Society expects the primary focus of children 
and adolescents to be their education and this is codified in compulsory 
school attendance legislation. Consequently, employment legislation 
typically limits the time and duration of the employment of children and 
adolescents. 
3. Morale Development: There are general provisions found in legislation 
prohibiting employment that is deleterious to the health, welfare, or 
moral or physical development of children and adolescents. Employment 
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in occupations and workplaces exposing children and adolescents to 
alcohol, gambling, and/or sexually explicit entertainment is normally 
prohibited. 
 
The support for this rationale is mixed. The effect of employment on 
academic performance and propensity to dropout of school is worrisome, but the 
causality is unclear. And the exposure of children and adolescents to adult vices 
in the workplace may be mitigated by their age-stratified employment prospects 
(Lawton, 1994; Franke, 2003; Bushnik, 2003; Carriere, 2005). A US study found 
the rate of injury for working children and adolescents to be nearly twice as high 
as for adults (Institute of Medicine, 1998). Canadian research on young workers 
(15- to 24-years-old) indicates they are significantly more likely to be injured on 
the job (WorkSafeBC, 2007; AHRE, 2007g). Inexperience and lack of training, 
being unwilling to ask questions, and being asked to do dangerous work are 
among the factors thought to contribute to this heightened injury rate. As Luke 
and Moore (2004) suggest, these characteristics appear even more likely to be 
present in those under 15 years of age. 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 
 
Discussion of child and adolescent employment in Canada often focuses 
on the effects of employment. Less attention is paid to the political economy in 
which this employment and its regulation exist. This is understandable: it is 
easier to see the effects of employment than the dynamics of the capitalist system 
in which we are enmeshed. Effects-centered research is also more palatable to 
policy communities and decision-makers because the analysis and proposed 
remedies do not normally threaten the underlying power structure. Yet there is 
value in understanding the political economy of regulation. For example, 
offloading of responsibility to parents for monitoring their children’s 
employment by the Government of British Columbia (Luke and Moore, 2004) is 
premised upon the potentially false assumption that parents’ and their children’s 
interests are aligned. Economic and/or ideological pressures exerted on families 
by advanced capitalism may in fact create a misalignment. 
Gary Teeple (2006) provides a useful framework within which to consider the 
rights of minors. The regulation of child and adolescent employment is an 
example of how civil, political and social rights (often collectively referred to as 
human rights) interact to support the dominant mode of production. Civil and 
political rights, rooted in western constitutions, codify and legitimize capitalist 
propertied relations. Civil rights emphasize the sanctity of private property and 
cast humans as economic actors. Granting individuals political rights to select 
their government legitimizes this arrangement—capitalism is framed as choice 
(however notional) made by the populace among differing public policies.  
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Capitalist systems typically struggle with social reproduction. The costs 
associated with ameliorating these problems are often socialized through 
government intervention in the operation of the labour market (e.g., employment 
standards) and the workplace (e.g., health and safety legislation), the 
reproduction of the labour force (e.g., education, medical care) and supporting 
“unproductive” members of society (e.g., child and elder income support 
programs). The social “rights” underlying these programs rarely find 
constitutional expression, in part because they run contrary to the civil and 
political rights entrenched in these documents. Instead, these rights are 
expressed in legislation and international agreements—voluntary acts of the state 
that manage (and result from) class-based pressure. The enforcement of these 
agreements depends largely upon the will of individual states. 
Minors have few civil and political rights because they are not “persons” 
in the context of capitalist relations: they are assumed unable to make binding 
and rational choices. The power of parents over their wards has been limited by 
the state because (1) the interests of children and their parents are not necessarily 
aligned and (2) minors face a significant disadvantage within this framework. 
For example, the participation of minors (voluntary or otherwise) in waged 
labour requires the state to protect them from the (in)action of parents as well as 
employers because the family structure does not necessarily have enough 
integrity to resist the pressures of advanced capitalism. 
In the workplace, minors form an ideal secondary labour market. They are 
largely without political and civil rights, poorly educated, intellectually 
malleable, and physically weak. Their easy availability also creates downward 
pressure on the wages of other workers. The regulation of child employment 
provides, therefore, a bulwark (of variable effectiveness) against the broader 
dynamics of capitalism. Yet governments creating and enforcing such a 
protective regime find themselves conflicted because their principal role of 
ensure the reproduction of capital and the social basis of capital accumulation 
may run contrary to the government’s own need for political legitimacy among 
its citizens.  
An attractive policy for government is to set standards but offload 
regulatory responsibility to parents (who are already minors’ legal guardians). 
Legislation is enacted and enforced only when parental controls are ineffective 
and/or the consequences of such employment has the potential to create a 
legitimation crisis for government. The viability of this approach is enhanced 
when procedures retard both the number of complaints filed and the visibility of 
patterns within those complaints. 
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ALBERTA’S CHILD AND ADOLESCENT LABOUR LAWS 
 
In 2006, Alberta had approximately 3.29 million residents, including 
631,515 persons under 15 years old (Statistics Canada 2007a, 2007b). The 
Legislature has enacted the Employment Standards Code (ESC) and its attached 
Employment Standards Regulation (ESR) that regulate the employment of minors. 
Other legislation also addresses child and adolescent employment, including 
explosive regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, radiation 
regulations under the Radiation Protection Act, and the Gaming and Liquor Act and 
its regulation. Denial of educational opportunities may also fall under the 
prohibitions contained in the Child Welfare Act and truancy is addressed under 
the School Act. 
The Employment Standards Code prohibits the employment of children 
under 12. Adolescents (12-14 years old) who are required to attend school under 
the School Act may not work during normal school hours, unless the minor is 
enrolled in an off-campus educational program (e.g., pre-apprenticeship or work 
experience program). Regulation allows adolescents to be employed outside of 
school hours (two hours on a school day, eight hours on a non-school day, and 
never between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m.) in four defined occupations (delivery of small 
wares for a retail store, clerk or messenger in an office, clerk in a retail store, and 
delivery of newspapers, flyers and handbills) as well as any occupation 
approved by the Director of Employment Standards. The defined occupations 
are often no longer viable employment possibilities for adolescents and 
employment in the service-sector jobs that are available has been managed 
through Director approvals. Employment must also not be injurious to the life, 
health, education or welfare of the adolescent, and the adolescent’s parent must 
consent in writing to the employment.  
Employers may apply for a permit from the Director to vary the 
standards found in the ESC or ESR. The government indicates it does not issue 
permits allowing adolescents to work in the construction industry or where an 
adolescent would be required to work around or with heavy equipment or 
potentially hazardous equipment or without adult supervision (AEII, 2007a). 
Permit application forms require a detailed explanation of the work the 
adolescent will be performing and the degree of adult supervision provided as 
well as information about shifts, rest breaks and tools/products used in 
employment. There is also a safety checklist required (including a hazard 
assessment), in which the employer attests that it will meet certain basic safety 
requirements regarding the identification and mitigation of workplace hazards 
(AEII, 2007b, 2007d).  
The Director of Employment Standards can also designate certain 
occupations as acceptable for adolescents. Currently, this is limited to certain jobs 
in the restaurant and food services industry (AEII, 2007c; Schultz and Taylor, 
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2006). This “safety checklist” approach allows employers to hire adolescents by 
filling out and filing a safety checklist and a hazard assessment with the 
government, both of which must be approved by the adolescent’s parent or 
guardian. The safety checklist is just that: the employer must provide the 
employees, name, attest it understands the requirements of the Code, and check 
off that it will perform a hazard assessment and safety orientation hazard before 
employment commences and adequately supervise the employee thereafter. It is 
signed by the employer, the employee and the employee’s guardian. This process 
stands in lieu of a permit application and is an example of regulation shifting 
from substantive standards to procedural ones (Bernstein, Lippel, Tucker and 
Vosko, 2006). 
Enforcement of employment standards in Alberta is predominantly 
complaint driven: someone (typically the employee) must complain that there is 
a violation of the law. Such a complaint normally triggers an investigation by an 
Employment Standards Officer (ESO). The remedies for a complaint are more 
remedial than punitive. An ESO may issue officer’s directives to pay unpaid 
wages, cease activities in contravention of the Act, etc. The ESC also provides for 
prosecution of offenders contingent upon approval by the Minister responsible 
for the Act. Few prosecutions are commenced and fewer result in conviction. 
ESOs have no power to fine violators for non-compliance with either the Act or 
the ESOs directive. Targeted inspections of specific employers and industries do 
occur, but the government was unable to provide any criteria to explanation how 
employers are selected. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In Canada, there is little credible study of the scope of child and 
adolescent employment or the effectiveness of enforcement activity. 
Governments do not collect data on the employment of minors under 15 or about 
violations of child and adolescent labour laws. There is no systematic study of 
enforcement of Canadian child or adolescent labour laws in the academic 
literature. What research is available has been done by advocacy groups and uses 
methods that make statistical or analytical generalization difficult (one of the 
better examples is Irwin, McBride and Strubin, 2005).  
Monitoring compliance with child and adolescent labour laws is difficult, 
even in developed countries. Monitoring compliance is thought labour intensive 
and subject to a significant observer effect (which may cause temporary 
compliance). ILO Convention 138 recognizes this and requires ratifying countries 
only to identify those responsible for enforcement, establish enforcement 
procedures (including penalties), and keep a register of employed minors 
(Swepston, 1982).  
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This study seeks to provide some preliminary insight into the extent of 
child and adolescent labour and the effectiveness o government regulation of it 
via a review of government practices as well as a survey of the employment rates 
of children and adolescents. This approach was developed after considering 
whether an examination of relevant Employment Standards complaints might 
provide insight into whether there was an effective short- and long-term 
intervention. Gaining access to case files was deemed unlikely and the incentive 
for subjects to provide false reports was expected to impede accurate data 
collection. This approach also only addresses instances of identified non-
compliance and excludes instances where a violation did not trigger a complaint.  
To develop a picture of government practices, government documents were 
collected (with the aid of a Freedom of Information request) with seven questions 
in mind: 
 
1. Does the government educate children, employers and parents about 
child labour laws? Complaint-driven compliance requires employee 
knowledge of the rules. 
2. Does the government know the employment rate of children and 
adolescents, the number and types of complaints made regarding their 
employment, and the number and types of workplace injuries sustained 
by them? The employment rate of children provides a good high-level 
indicator of compliance (as most employment of those under 12 is illegal). 
Compliance data provides a basis for identifying trends in violations and 
targeting enforcement activity. Injury data can be used to determine 
whether existing approved occupations for adolescents are appropriate. 
3. Does the government systematically identify and target employers of 
children or adolescents for enforcement to ensure compliance? Targeted 
enforcement is more likely to result in compliance. 
4. Does the government have and follow a policy regarding the examination 
and validation of permit applications and safety checklists? Permits vary 
legislation on an ad hoc basis so reviews should be rigorous; safety 
checklists are self-regulation and require oversight. 
5. Does the government respond immediately to complaints about child or 
adolescent employment? Speed of response, particularly where a 
vulnerable population is concerned, is an indicator of short-term 
enforcement effectiveness. 
6. Does the government systematically follow-up on orders issued by 
Employment Standards officers when violations are found? The absence 
of follow-up can lead to perfunctory compliance. This is particularly the 
case with a vulnerable population, where ineffective enforcement may 
discourage further complaints. 
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7. Does the government consistently prosecute violations? Failure to 
prosecute repeated or egregious non-compliance eliminates the incentive 
for compliance. The only risk of non-compliance is paying whatever is 
rightfully owed to employee under statute.  
 
Approximate levels of child and adolescent employment were 
determined by commissioning a representative survey of 1200 homes between 
May and June 2008. Respondents provided information on how many children 
and adolescents resided with them and how many were employed (i.e., 
exchanging labour for wages) outside of their home during the past year. The 
definition of child used in the survey (9-11 years old) is narrower than the 
definition of child implicit in the Employment Standards Code (under 12) and was 
selected to better get at the employment rate of children most likely to be 
employed.  
The main potential source of error in this study is that it largely relies on 
documentary analysis of government policies. Interviews with managers, 
employment standards policy staff and officers would have increased the 
opportunity to validate that practice mirrors policy and inquire about specific 
enforcement behaviour. Discrete inquiries with various staff members indicated 
they were reluctant or unwilling to be interviewed because they feared employer 
reprisal. The potential for respondent bias to undermine the validity of interview 
data meant this line of inquiry was not pursued. 
 
ANALYSIS OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
The government responds to complaints about the employment of 
children and adolescents with a same-day investigation by an ESO. The 
government conducted a single prosecution regarding violations of child or 
adolescent employment laws between 2004 and 2007. This case involved an 
under-aged employee who was killed on the job (AEII, 2007h) and the status of 
the prosecution is unknown. The province does not conduct any special follow-
up with employers subject to an order pertaining to a child or adolescent. The 
government was also unable to provide any evidence that it can identify or does 
target employers of children or adolescents for special enforcement activity 
(AEII, 2007h).  
Limitations in the government’s Employment Standards Information 
System mean the government can only generate summary statistics about the 
number and types of complaints made about child and adolescent employment 
and the number and types of workplace injuries sustained by them via a 
laborious hand sorting and counting of paper files. No such statistics were 
readily available from the government, suggesting it does not specifically 
monitor violations of child and adolescent employment laws. 
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The government provides in-person and online workshops and train-the-
trainer events to educate Albertans about employment standards, with the 
majority of these programs being aimed at employers. Between 2004 and 2007, 
education staffing hovered around three full-time equivalent positions. These 
programs provide general information about the rules regulating the 
employment children or adolescents. The province also conducts periodic 
advertising campaigns aimed at young workers and particular industries, and 
educational materials are available upon request. Finally, the province makes 
available a wide variety of fact sheets on its website and through its Employment 
Standards call centre. 
Between 2004 and 2007, the government approved 1080 permits affecting 
adolescents (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: 
 Permits Issued by Age, 2004-2007 
 Approved Denied Total Approval Rate 
2004 307 18 325 94.5% 
2005 355 16 371 95.7% 
2006 208 41 249 83.5% 
2007 210 36 246 85.4% 
Note: A small number of permit applications that were withdrawn or abandoned each year have been excluded 
from the total. There are some small internal discrepancies in the data provided by the government; this data 
was derived from a hand-count by the author of permits issued and denied. Source: AEII (2008). 
 
 
The 2006 decrease in permits issued was caused by the introduction, mid-
way through 2005, of safety checklists in the restaurant and food services 
industry. By combining two data sets, it is possible to identify the growth in both 
adolescent employment requiring a permit and in the restaurant and food service 
industry (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: 
Permits and Safety Checklists, 2004-2007 
 Permits, Non-Restaurant Work Permits and Safety Checklists, Restaurant Work 
2004 116 277 
2005 170 288 
2006 209 960 
2007 199 806 
Note: There are some small internal discrepancies in the permit approval data provided by the government; 
this data was derived from summary information provided by the government in order to maintain 
comparability between the permit and checklist numbers in this table. For this reason, there is some variation 
between Tables 1 and 2. Source: AEII (2008), AEII (2007e). 
 
39   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – Volume 13 – Spring 2009 
 
 
It is unclear if the increased numbers of safety checklists means more 
adolescents are being employed in the restaurant and food services industry, 
more employers are reporting this employment, or some combination of these 
two explanations.  
During this time period, the government assigned 1.5 full-time equivalent 
professional staff to review both permits and safety checklists. Permits 
applications are reviewed by professional staff who make a recommendation to 
the Director of Employment Standards. There is no written policy regarding the 
steps that must be taken in the investigation of permits. Informal discussions 
suggest investigation is typically a paper review followed by a phone call to the 
employer if necessary. The professional staff also review submitted checklists 
and omissions are brought to the attention of the employer. Once satisfied that 
the safety checklist is complete, the checklist is filed. Relying on provisions in the 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act that limits the disclosure 
obligation of government to material that can be formulated from electronic 
records, the government chose not to provide any information about the 
methods by which it verifies safety checklists or, if any verification takes place, 
the degree of (non)compliance found by this verification (AEI, 2008).  
The picture that emerges of compliance is that, for the most part, the government 
relies on hortatory, capacity building and soft incentive-based policy instruments 
to enforce the ESC. This may reflect the lack of harder enforcement mechanisms 
(e.g., fines, stop-work orders) and limited willingness of the government to 
prosecute violations. It has also offloaded some regulatory responsibility to 
employers and parents through the safety checklists system. While many 
commentators (e.g., AFL, 2006a, 2006b, 2007) focus on the intricacies of the 
permitting and checklist process, most adolescent employment occurs without 
any government oversight. The survey results presented below provide useful 
context in considering the scope of child and adolescent employment.  
 
CHILD AND ADOLESCENT EMPLOYMENT LEVELS 
 
Neither the federal nor provincial governments collect statistics regarding 
the employment rates of children or adolescents, although statistics for those 
ages 15 and older are available (Usalcas and Bowlby, 2006). American data 
suggests that 30.6% of 12-year-olds, 36.9% of 13-year-olds and 35.4% of 14-year-
olds are employed during the school year (Institute of Medicine, 1998).  
A survey of 1211 Alberta homes found 31.2% of homes had minors under 
15 years of age in residence. The sampling error at a 95% confidence level is +/-
2.8%. A total of 149 children (aged 9-11) and 170 adolescents (aged 12-14) were 
identified, with the employment rate outside of the home for children being 8.7% 
and for adolescents being 29.4% (see Table 3). The majority of the employment in 
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each group occurs at the upper end of each age bracket. There is also some 
evidence of employment among those under 9 years old. 
 
Table 3: 
Employment Rate of Children and Adolescents in Alberta 
 Sample Employed Employed Rate 2007 Population 
Children (9-11) 149 13 8.7% 129,785 
Adolescents (12-14) 170 50 29.4% 134,693 
Source: Population Research Laboratory (2008); Statistics Canada (2008) 
 
These results should be viewed cautiously as the sample is small. Further, 
the dataset does not allow us to disaggregate children’s employment by type of 
work. Consequently, some forms of employment allowed under the Employment 
Standards Code (e.g., agricultural work) and other forms of employment excluded 
from consideration by Employment Standards without statutory basis (e.g., 
landscape maintenance, child care of non-siblings) is likely captured. Replication 
of this study (with occupational data) is underway at the time of publication. 
Assuming the percentages are valid, this survey suggests that approximately 
11,291 children and 39,600 adolescents were employed in Alberta between June 
of 2007 and June of 2008. The number of children employed (many perhaps 
illegally) raises significant concerns about the effectiveness of Alberta’s 
enforcement regime. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The government relies significantly on hortatory instruments to enforce 
child and adolescent labour laws. Complaints are handled with expedition but 
government relies almost entirely soft incentive-based instruments (e.g., officer 
orders) to address them. Prosecution and publicity are rare and there are no 
other enforcement mechanisms available in the legislation other than for 
recovering unpaid earnings. The government appears to neither systematically 
track violations of child and adolescent labour laws nor target them.  
There are also loopholes and ways around the rules. Children and 
adolescents performing primary agricultural work are statutorily excluded from 
rules regulating the employment of minors as well as occupational health and 
safety requirements. The school attendance patterns of home-schooled 
adolescents can be manipulated with the collusion of their parents such that the 
normal limit of 24 hours of weekly employment during the school year can be 
extended to up to 48 hours per week (6 days x 8 hours). Where this employment 
entails agricultural work in a (typically) religious/ethnic agricultural 
community, there is effectively no regulation. No data on the number of home-
schooled children whose attendance pattern is manipulated is available, 
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although the number is thought to be small. This sort of loophole has been 
commonly found, even in countries that have ratified ILO standards on child 
employment (Swepston, 1982).  
The use of Director permits allows employers to gain exceptions to the 
rules without having to seek a public change to the ESR. Permits are both faster 
and more private than regulatory changes. Permits also frame exceptions as 
technical decisions, rather than political ones, and offload responsibility to the 
Director of Employment Standards. It also puts the government in the position of 
“blessing” employment relationships that it may not have meaningfully 
investigated. Safety checklists, to some degree, extricate the government from 
this case-by-case approval, by creating procedural requirements for the employer 
and making parents ultimately responsible for approving the employment 
relationship. Whether parents can and do take on this responsibility bears further 
investigation. 
The degree of meaningful oversight created by permitting process is open 
to question. The number of non-restaurant permits applications rose by 71% 
between 2004 and 2007 while restaurant-related permits/checklists rose by 191%. 
During this time period, no additional staff resources were devoted to processing 
these applications. This may indicate the rigor with which permits are assessed 
has declined. The rate at which permits were granted also appears to have 
declined, perhaps indicating oversight became more rigorous over time. Yet, 
when one controls for the presence of restaurant-work permits in 2004 and 2005, 
the decline in the acceptance rate essentially disappears. Also bearing on the 
rigor of oversight is the government assertion (Worksite News, 2005) that safety 
checklists were warranted because restaurant permits were automatically 
approved when applied for.  
The regulation of child employment is particularly concerning. The 
preliminary data on child employment suggests over 11,000 children are 
employed outside of their homes. Other than those children to whom the ESC 
employment prohibition does not apply (e.g., children working in agriculture), 
these children may well have been employed contrary to the prohibitions 
outlined in the Employment Standards Code. A more nuanced assessment of 
illegality will be possible once a 2009 replication study has been completed.  
Enforcement of the ESC and ESR is triggered only when a complaint is filed, a 
defining characteristic of Alberta’s employment standard system. The 
effectiveness of complaint-based enforcement turns upon the affected parties 
knowing the rules, being able to relate these rules to a specific employment 
situation, and choosing to enforce these rules by filing a complaint. The affected 
parties (absent an officious bystander) are the employer, the child or adolescent, 
and the parents.  
The employer is the most likely to know the rules and whether they are 
being broken but is unlikely to file or prompt the filing of a complaint; rather, 
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they would either remedy the situation themselves or let it continue. Parents may 
(or may not) be knowledgeable enough about the relevant laws and the 
conditions in their child’s or adolescent’s workplace to determine if a 
contravention is occurring. Assuming they know a contravention is occurring, 
they must then decide to file a complaint, a decision that may be mitigated by 
their ideological beliefs and/or economic motives. 
The party best informed about the treatment of workers in a workplace is 
the worker. This is the basis that complaint-driven systems for adults are 
justified. While an adult worker may be reluctant to complain about their 
employer, that is their choice as a (notionally) free party to the employment 
contract. But does this reasoning apply to children and adolescents? While adults 
and children hold broadly similar labour market positions, there are significant 
differences in their social location (Bernstein et al., 2006). Children and 
adolescents are less likely know their rights and less able to determine if their 
treatment is lawful. To file a complaint, children or adolescents must face the 
greater power the employer wields due to the master-and-servant dynamic as 
well as the power differential associated with adult-child relationships. 
This raises troubling questions about the appropriateness of complaint-
based enforcement of child and adolescent labour laws. The limited number of 
complaints such a system is likely to generate makes employers who violate 
child and adolescent labour law administratively invisible and thus unlikely to 
be the subject of targeted inspections of “bad actors.” Overall, Alberta’s mix of 
policy instruments seems unlikely to discourage violations of these rules: the 
only penalty an employer faces is having to pay employee any money they may 
have been shorted and ceasing illegal employment. That is to say, violation is 
effectively risk-free for the employer. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study raises some question about the degree to which Alberta’s laws 
regulating child and adolescent employment are enforced. While the province 
promptly investigates complaints about the employment of children and 
adolescents, it otherwise does little to meaningfully enforce laws or deter 
violations. This seems unlikely to result in the fair, safe and healthy workplaces 
that the government has established as a goal for this program. 
It is unclear why Alberta’s enforcement is not proactive and thorough. 
Alberta has the financial resources to enforce its laws and the standards 
themselves reflect the moral onus on the government to prevent children from 
being mistreated, exploited or placed in positions of significant risk. It may be 
that enforcement practices reflect an adaptive response by the civil service. Few 
enforcement mechanisms and unwillingness by politicians to prosecute provides 
ESOs with little prospect for recourse when violations are discovered. Further, 
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the large number of employers and the relative invisibility of non-compliance 
make discovering violations difficult. The potential presence of a family 
relationship between the employer and the child/adolescent may make 
enforcement politically risky for the civil service. 
The limited enforcement options and unwillingness to prosecute may 
also reflect the ideological position of government. Alberta is often characterized 
as being guiding by neoliberal and/or neoconservative prescriptions regarding 
the (un)involvement of the state in regulating the market and the family 
(Harrison, 1995, 2005; Harrison and Laxer, 1995; Taft, 1997, Taft and Steward, 
2000;  Mansell, 1997; Dyck, 1997; Lisac, 1995). This explanation is also consistent 
with Teeple’s discussion about the political economy of minor’s rights. This 
provides a plausible explanation for the government establishing rules that 
create the appearance it is protecting children and adolescents, but limiting 
meaningful enforcement to instances when a significant event (such as the death 
of a child) threatens this appearance.  
This study suggests several lines of further inquiry. Foremost is 
confirmation of the employment rates of child and adolescents with a more 
nuanced dataset capable of detailing the type(s) of employment undertaken. In 
conjunction with this study, parent-child interviews are being undertaken to 
determine whether minors’ employers follow the statutory requirements for 
employment, whether minors can identify illegal treatment, and how they 
remedy violations. This research ought to provide insight into whether a 
complaint-based system results in violations of employment standards that (1) 
are unreported and (2) are not remedied. As part of this inquiry, it will be 
determine whether parents can and do monitor the employment of their children 
and act to prevent and remedy violations.  
A second line of inquiry would be a national comparison of legislative 
requirements, enforcement procedures, and the rates and fields of employment 
for children and adolescents. This would provide insight into which mix of 
policy instruments best achieves the enforcement of child and adolescent labour 
laws. It is, of course, difficult to assess whether workplaces are fair, healthy and 
safe solely by considering the enforcement of standards. The standards 
themselves also warrant scrutiny. Among the more egregious regulatory gaps 
identified by this study is the exclusion of children and adolescents engaged in 
agricultural work from the protections offered by employment standards and 
occupational health and safety. Consequently, a third line of inquiry would be to 
ascertain and evaluate the rationale and narratives that are used to justify the 
exclusion of farm work by children and adolescents from statutory coverage.  
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